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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

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2/O/CURUJ/R66-63
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STATUS OF CUBA/SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS AS OF 29 NOVEMBER 1963

PART I A: SOVIET MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND HAVANA

The Soviet Ministry of Defense-subordinated link 'B' between Moscow and Havana continues to be active in both Morse and radio-printer scrambler as late as 28 November 1963. Operator chatter sent in reverse order again was noted on 20 November. The last time this chatter was observed was on 15 October.

PART I B: SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN CUBA

Since 12 November 1963 three known attempts to break in on Soviet/Cuban communications activities have been noted. The first attempt was made on the Air Defense link between Limonar and a terminal suspected of being in the San Julian area. On that occasion, an activity utilizing the callsign NNU contacted one of the Soviet operators and queried him as to his location and whether there was any traffic for him. A conversation of approximately 10 minutes ensued, containing repeated queries as to the location of the Soviet station, before the Soviet operator terminated the schedule.

Later the same day a possible second attempt of the same type was made. This time, the link interrupted was the Air Defense link between Limogar and Sagua La Grande, and the unidentified activity used the callsign NSS. Again the Soviet terminated the conversation without divulging any information as to his whereabouts.

On 15 November, an attempt was made by an unidentified activity to portray itself as net control of the Soviet Naval network in Cuba. At 2102Z the station made a collective call utilizing the correct signals for the day. However, the attempt was abortive as a result of the rather poor simulation of Soviet procedure. Minutes after the attempt the control of the Soviet naval net sent a warning to the other stations: "some other station is working with our callsign."

News of the death of President KENNEDY was noted on the Naval net on 23 November. Operator chatter messages were noted which asked for details of the assassination. The daily details mentioned were that "Yastrebov in Dallas he was shot by a sniper with a large calibre (rifle) [REDACTED]... Mortally wounded JOHN KENNEDY. He died."

During the past week nine Soviet Formos/Cuba HF links used scrambler. They were as follows: the two in subordinated links with both terminals in the Bayamo area, the uncoordinated link

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between the Havana and Holguin areas, the new Air Defense-associated link between the Havana and Camaguey areas, the Limonar-Pinar del Rio and Sagua la Grande links of the Western Sector Weapons Control Group and the Camaguey-Victoria de las Tunas and Santiago de Cuba areas of the Eastern Sector Weapons Control Group, and a new Limonar-controlled Air Defense-associated link on which scrambler was first heard 21 and 22/23 November. The outstation terminal of this new link is unlocated. Soviet scrambler activity was noted as late as 23 November on Cuban microwave facilities and 27 November on Soviet multi-channel/VHF (R-401) facilities.

PART I C: SOVIET AIR AND AIR DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS

The subscriber to the Soviet Forces Cuba (SFC) Western Sector Weapons Control group located at San Antonio de los Baños continues to be inactive in HF Morse communications as of 27 November. The station was last noted active on 15 October 1963. It is possible that the air defense-associated link between Limonar and an unlocated station is now serving the weapons control group function. Scrambler communications were noted on the link on 21 November, for the first time, and again on 22/23 November.

All three of the subscribers to the Eastern Sector Weapons Control Group reappeared in HF Morse communications on 21 November 1963. The stations at Santiago de Cuba, Victoria de las Tunas, and an unrecovered location have not been heard in HF Morse communications since 23 October, 03 November, and 06 November, respectively. No explanation can be offered at this time for these periods of Morse inactivity.

The Soviet Forces Cuba radar reporting groups continue to use the Cuban low level of key system (see 2/O/CURUJ/R203-63) as of 27 November 1963. As in the past, both radar operational and Spanish language messages were encrypted in the system.

Conversations on Sov. R VHF multi-channel (R-401) radio relay facilities on 11 November 1963 between SAM regimental headquarters at Victoria de las Tunas and a subordinate SAM site at Los Angeles revealed that some Soviet SAM personnel would arrive in Cuba about 20 November aboard a vessel which departed Leningrad on 05 November. There was no reference to the total number of personnel arriving; however, the speaker at the regiment indicated that he knew two of the individuals who were arriving. The names of the individuals have not been previously observed in Soviet SAM communications in Cuba.

A conversation on 08 October 1963 between probable SAM regimental headquarters at Santiago de las Vegas and a subordinate SAM site at Siglova Airfield contain a reference to Mexico. The speaker at the regiment stated "We YUREA (further unidentified) is arriving in a few days, isn't YUREA. You know, YUREA? Well . . . they are (IC) together with him to Mexico, isn't? . . . They have an endless plan, do you understand? Just to go. . . yes. . . of course."

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Also discussed was the arrival of aircraft from the Soviet Union and the question of mail being aboard the flight which arrived at Havana on 08 October. A TU-114 did arrive in Cuba on 08 October and two TU-114 air freight arrived Cuba on 11 October. In addition to the country of Mexico, there are three places in Cuba that bear that name; they are at 21-18N 77-16W, 21-46N 77-43W, and 21-18N 77-33W. There are no Soviet SAM installations near any of these locations.

Radio operators on SPC air defense communications continue to make reference to inexperienced operators. It is possibly significant that experienced operators are running the sets during the times of the GOLDEN THORN missions. Radio operators have also discussed the departure of the Soviet vessel KALEININ.

Five intercepts of missile/target tracking S-band FAN SONG (BF 29) radars have been reported by CLINT sources during the past week. A brief intercept at 1334Z on 23 November tends to confirm operation of the S-band version of FAN SONG radar at the Punta Brava site (23-01N 82-31W). Other S-band FAN SONG sites noted active were Mariel, Managua, Havana East and Matanzas.

CLINT information indicates S-band FAN SONG radars in operation at fourteen of the twenty-four SAM sites in Cuba, including two emitters located at San Julian.

S-band FAN SONG intercepts have occurred daily since 11 November 1963, except for today, 26 November. The duration of the target tracking signals recorded thus far in November has averaged less than four minutes, with approximately fifty percent of the recent intercepts not exceeding one minute in duration. The longest recent intercept occurred on 15 November for a period of approximately 19 minutes. The majority of intercepts during the current month have occurred during morning hours; however, intercepts after 1700Z were reported on 14, 20 and 23 November.

PART II: CUBAN COMMUNICATIONS

Cuban microwave facilities revealed a new communications link serving the Anti-air Defense/Revolutionary Air Force (DAA/FAR) Headquarters and a subordinate CRAF facility at Varadero on 14 November 1963. The terminal at Varadero has subsequently been active on 19 November 1963 and was referred to in a conversation between the Anti-Air Defense/Revolutionary Air Force (DAA/FAR) Headquarters and an unknown terminal on 22 November 1963. Activity has consisted of one-directional chatter with only one message, requesting oxygen tanks and oil, having been noted on 14 November. This link may preage an increase of activity at Varadero.

PART III A: CUBAN GROUND FORCES

The continuation of operations by Anti-Insurgent Forces (ICB)

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In the Recambray Mountain area has been observed in COMINT during this reporting period. In addition to the ICB forces reported to be participating in this operation, the deployment of Western Army troops to the area indicates an increased operational effort. (2/0/GUJ/R65-63 and 2/0/GUJ/R63-63).

Several references to a combing operation utilizing the combined efforts of the Department of State Security (DSE), Department of Public Order (DOP) and the coastal vigilance observation post force were reflected in messages from Central Army HQ, Santa Clara, to MINFAR, Havana, on 21 November. This operation was effected at Cayo Almendral (22-22N 79-1W), Municipality of Yaguajay, in order to apprehend persons attempting to flee the country (2/SL/GUJ/R293-63).

There were also several messages about an operation in the Sagua la Grande Area of Las Villas Province. An insurgent band consisting of three individuals was captured at San Pedro Farm, in the Municipality of Corozalillo (22-59N 80-36W), on 21 November. Members of ICB Military Unit Number 3009 (San Vicente, 22-55N 80-27W) were apparently utilized for this operation (2/SL/GUJ/R286-63, 2/0/GUJ/R292-63).

Reference to a "new organization" was observed in a message intercepted on anti-insurgent Forces communications at 2126Z on 26 November. The chief of personnel, ICB Division, Trinidad, ordered the Chief of Personnel of his subordinate battalions to report to his headquarters to try to resolve the new organization. Since mention was made of a new organization and not "reorganization," the possibility exists that this is in reference to the Cuban Government's Anti-Raider Forces (LCF). Prior references to LCF have not been observed in this particular area, substantiating the possibility of the LCF organization in southern Las Villas Province (2/0/GUJ/R601-63).

The bilateral field maneuvers conducted by elements of the Central Army during the period 25 to 30 November were apparently witnessed by officials representing Ground Forces elements throughout Cuba. Invitations to observe these maneuvers were extended to officials or delegations of Western Army Headquarters and First Army Headquarters, Anti-Air Defense/FAR, and Naval Headquarters, Havana. Representatives from MINFAR were also invited, and all observers were to be at Cienfuegos by 2100Z on 24 November, indicating that the exercises (or at least some phase of these maneuvers) were to be held in the Cienfuegos area (2/SL/GUJ/R20-63).

An interest of the Cuban Military Intelligence in the U.S.-Latin American military exercises ("Cabeza de Playa America"), to be held next year in Galveston, was evidenced by the intercept of a message in which the Chief of Intelligence at First Army Headquarters reported the summons to his counterpart in Guantanamo on 21 November 1963 (2/0/GUJ/R63-63).

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2/O/CUN/J/R66-63

All subordinate units of the First Army Headquarters in both Eastern and Southwestern Oriente were placed in an alert status at 2320Z on 22 November 1963 (2/LRL/CUN/R187-63).

The urgent need of food at the Pilon (probably 19-58N 77-19W) Coastal Battalion was mentioned in a message from the Chief, South Sector, Sierra Maestra Headquarters, Pilon, to Chief of Services, First Army Headquarters, on 25 November 1963 (2/LRL/CUN/R66-63).

PART III-B: CUBA IN COMMUNICATIONS

One of the LST's, the RIOBATO, has suffered one of the first accidents involving a ROMAR vessel in Cuba. At approximately 0500Z on 26 November the LC-250 ran aground while entering the port of Mariel, sustaining uncontrollable leaks. Salvage vessels sent to the scene included the GC-59, BC-11, and LV-28. They were estimated to have worked until 2215Z, when it was determined salvage operations were complete (2/QS/CUN/R679-63 at Mariel (2/QS/CUN/R66-63)). The LC-250 is now in drydock, presumably

A Cuban merchant ship, the INDALCIO was forced by passengers aboard the vessel who reported to have taken asylum at the base but a reliable collateral source states that 15 persons remained at the base and four others returned with the INDALCIO. The vessel was escorted by a destroyer to the naval landing to Caimanera (19-32N 75-07W) from the Naval Base (2/LRL/CUN/R190, 186-63 and 2/QS/CUN/R66-63). A later report disclosed that 12 passengers and 3 crewmen, including the ship's captain, remained at the Guantanamo Naval Base (2/LRL/CUN/R190-63).

An alert which began on 22 November in Oriente Province was apparently prompted by the death of President KENNEDY. While no orders or directives have been noted canceling the alert, there were indications that it probably was to terminate on 25 November. On 25 November instructions were passed from bases to a subordinate unit that losses could be granted to 21 percent of its personnel (2/O/C-7/R24-63 and 2/O/CUN/R195-63).

The USS JOSEPH E. MILLER, TAG-171, has been the subject of recurring Cuban reports concerning its position. These reports have been noted before passing from Havana to Cabanas, the KMAK-class ROMC Headquarters. The reports were first noted in September and have continued until November (2/O/CUN/R195-63).

The Cuban Naval Base was informed on 23 November by Naval Headquarters in Havana that there would be exercises scheduled from 23 to 30 November in the Key West area by U.S. aircraft. The exercises would include pretrial and lateral firing, air to ground firing and illumination passes. The information was reported to have been obtained "by our sources." These sources were not identified (2/LRL/CUN/R20-63).

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The coast guard vessel CG-79 was ordered on 22 November to patrol an area from 22-40N 83-47W to 22-50N 83-39W to intercept some pirate vessels. Later the vessel was directed to patrol from 22-43N 84-02W to a point 20 miles north of Bahia Honda and then to go to Havana upon completion of the assignment. Apparently, this mission was carried out without success since there have been no further reflections of the pirate vessels (2/0/CUN/R193-63 and 2/QS/CUN/R054-63).

The inception of the Anti-Pirate Organization (LCP, LUCHA CONTRA PIRATAS), was revealed as in the Western as well as in the Central and probably Eastern portions of Cuba when a Captain (FNU) PANTOJA, identified as the Chief of the LCP, authorized the installation of some unidentified equipment at an observation post in the Western Naval District. A Major ENRICO LUIS RODRIGUEZ has been noted as LCP Commander; it is believed that Capt. PANTOJA is Commander of the Western LCP forces or possibly a local LCP commander in the Western Naval District. The LCP is probably subordinate to the Anti-Insurgent Forces (2/0/CUJ/R56-63).

There has been only one inter-area movement noted in the period covered by this report. On 27 November intercept disclosed that the frigate F-543, which has been operating out of Cienfuegos since 28 August 1963, was to return to Havana. On 29 November the F543 reported it had entered Eastern Naval District jurisdictional waters. The time of departure from Cienfuegos was not observed (2/0/CUN/R060-63).

A possible anti-aircraft firing practice was held, probably in the Cubanas area, on 28 November from 1500Z to 1800Z. The firing consisted of 37-mm artillery pieces. It was reported that an area higher than 5,000 meters or further than 300 meters from the coast would be considered safe (2/0/KIM/R32-63).

The ROMAN-class PGH's (LC) were active in various practices during the week. Two LC's were involved in E-2 technique training from 0600Z to 1700Z. On 28 November, four LC's participated in an unscripted type of practice in the Cubanas/Muriel area from 1400Z to 1700Z (see 2/0/CUN/R070-63, R072-63, R082-63).

In the Eastern Sea, probably the CG-93 was engaged in night exercises of a three-fold nature: there was training of officers in night navigation, familiarization of local communications procedures, and a radar exercise (probably a radar calibration test for Punta de Mulas) (see 2/0/CUN/R192-63).

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